It has been suggested that Mexican investors were the "front-runners" in the peso crisis of December 1994, turning pessimistic before international investors. Different expectations about their own economy, perhaps due to asymmetric information, prompted Mexican investors to be the first ones to leave the country. This paper investigates whether data from three Mexican country funds provide evidence that supports the "divergent expectations" hypothesis. We find that, right before the devaluation, Mexican country fund Net Asset Values (driven mainly by Mexican investors) dropped faster than their prices (driven mainly by foreign investors). Moreover, we find that Mexican NAVS tend to Granger-cause the country fund prices. This suggests that causality, in some sense, flows from the Mexico City investor community to the Wall Street investor community.
I. Introduction
2Countryfunds are ideally suited to help investigateseveralquestions.As a secondconcern,the crisis also generated new interest in the contagion effects of crises. In the present paper we concentrateon the "asymmetricinformation"hypothesis,while we study contagion in Frankel and Schmukler(1996) .
If markets were perfectly efficient and internationally integrated, then the price of the fund would be equal to the NAV. However this is not the case. We argue that the price of the country fund, which is traded on Wall Street, reflects relatively better the information and expectations held by international investors, while the NAV, which is determined in Mexico City, reflects relatively better the information and expectations held by local investors. In other words, the country fund discount, which is the percentage difference between the two prices, reflects the relative optimism of domestic versus international. A large discount indicates that domestic residents have relatively more favorable expectations. A premium indicates that foreigners have relatively more favorable expectations. The present paper focuses on what might variously be called the hypothesis of "divergent sentiments,"
"heterogeneous expectations," "asymmetric information," or "closeness to information."3
Anticipating the most interesting fact in this paper, Figures 1-3 Frankel(1994a,p.17) . Figure 2 , the decline began two weeks before the devaluation. This seems to constitute the sort of evidence the existence of which was questioned by Jaime Serra in the quote at the head of this paper.
Section II looks at fund prices in New York, the long-run and short-run relationships between the Mexican on the one hand, and the NAVS of their portfolios in Mexico City, on the other. Its purpose is to explain the behavior of discounts in the short run and long run, given the barriers to arbitrage that must exist. We also explain how the "divergent expectations" hypothesis is a useful complement to the "investor sentiments"
and the "loss-aversion" models of country funds suggested by earlier researchers. Section III investigates whether the evidence is consistent with the "divergent expectations" hypothesis.
II. Short-Runand Long-RunBehaviorof CountryFundDiscounts.

a) Country Fund Discounts. Existing Hypotheses:
A closed-end country fund (hereinafter country fund) consists of a fixed number of shares that are invested in a set of stocks from a particular country. Unlike open-end funds, once the fund is established new shares cannot be issued, while existing shares cannot be redeemed. Investors willing to buy or sell country-fund shares need to trade them on secondary security markets. Country funds are traded in New York at their U.S. dollar price. As already noted, if markets were efficient, frictionless, and perfectly integrated internationally, the price of a fund should be equal to its NAV -which is the sum of the U.S. dollar market value of the individual equities at the home country. In practice, however, this is seldom the case. The gaps between prices and NAVS are both large and variable. . ,..
;, c . .
It is well known that country funds, as well as domestic closed-end funds, trade at an average discount. Discounts are equal to log(NAVt/pricet). Various papers, such as .,
Hardouvelis. La Porta and Wizman (1994), Senbet (1993, 1994) and Lee,.and Shleifer and Thaler (1991) 3) Individual investors could buy the fund and sell individual shares short.
4)
Individual international investors will have a lower demand for local shares than they would otherwise, and investors will have a higher demand for the country fund than they would otherwise.
Particular Limitations:
1') Requires that investor has a lot of capital, and that the local market is so liquid that large sales do not drive the prices down.
2') It maybe difficult to get all of the necessary parties to agree to open-end it. If the manager wanted to deal with fluctuating inflows and redemptions, requiring new investments or liquidations, she would have started an open-end fund in the frostplace.
3') Short-selling is difficult (or even prohibited) in many of these markets, especially if it means trying simultaneously to sell short a large number of holdings.
4')
This factor (like number 3) will indeed put downward pressure on local share prices and upward pressure on country fund prices; but there is no reason to think the influence should be great enough to eliminate the price disparity.
General Limitations to All Strategies:
a) Markets may be illiquid. For example, Vanguard (1995) notes that a country's entire market value, or capitalization, maybe less than that of a single large U.S. company. In many countries, the shares held by the country funds constitute a large fraction of the shares outstanding. Some shares turn over infrequently. The series of obstacles to arbitrage imply that expected discounts are different from zero. More properly, the observed fact of these disparities implies that the obstacles must exist. Even though perfect arbitrage is not to be expected, a large enough NAVprice difference should generate some kind of arbitrage. We suggest that discounts fluctuate inside bands before prompting much arbitrage activity. If discounts move below or above the band, rational investors will seek to profit from the NAV-price difference because the expected gains are substantial.
Given that barriers to arbitrage exist, partially segmenting the markets, the price in Mexico must reflect relatively more closely the asset demands of Mexican residents, and that in New York the demands of foreign residents. It follows that, to whatever extent Mexican investors have different expectations from foreign investors, the country fund discount will to a degree reflect the difference in expectations.
Discounts appear to be mean-reverting. Therefore shocks have larger effects in the short run than in the long run.4 Some of the limitations to arbitrage, such as market illiquidity and exchange rate risk, explain the limited speed of mean reversion. Since it takes time to find buyers in local markets for large blocks of stocks, without pushing down the price. the short run may display large gaps. Over a longer horizon, buyers can be found, and discounts shrink. Moreover returns are more uncertain in turbulent periods than in periods of tranquility, allowing discounts to deviate from their long-run equilibrium level.
The dynamics of discounts can be summed up in the following way. There exists a stationary long-run relationship between each price and its NAV. Given a constant average discount, an innovation the fund's price in the long run.
only partially transmitted to its inthefund's NAV is expected to be fully transmitted to
On the other hand, a change in a NAV is expected to be price, changing the average short-run discount. In other words, the short-run elasticity of price with respect to NAV is expected to be less than one, while the long-run elasticity is expected to be close to one.
4 Tests of stationarity in discounts are reported below, concludingthat discounts are meanrevertingprocesses. Hardouveliset al. (1993)also find stationarydiscounts.
The existing hypotheses ("investor sentiment" and "loss-aversion") do not explain the complete story. They partly explain the magnitude and persistence of the premia.
However, it remains to be understood why NAVS and prices reacted in different ways to the Mexican crisis. These hypotheses do not predict why discounts turned into premia Therefore, discounts turned into premia even though investors were pessimistic about Mexico.
c) Empirical Testing:
In this subsection we estimate the short-run and long-run relationships between the three Mexican prices and their respective NAVS.5We first determine the stationarity of the series and the long-run relationships from the cointegrating vectors. Then we study the short-run adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium by error-correction models.
The relationship between prices and NAVS, as well as that between discounts and exchange rates are analyzed.
5The funds'descriptionsare detailedin Appendix1, as well as the differencebetweenprices and NAVS.
Unit root tests, displayed in Part a of We also test the hypothesis that the cointegrating vector between prices and NAVS is (1, -l) . We cannot tell that directly from the cointegrating vector, because of the presence of nuisance parameters. Since the residuals are autoconelated, the fact that there is cointegration is not sufficient to imply that the errors are i.i.d. Normal. As a consequence, we need to correct the statistics so that they are asymptotically Normal. We perform the correction, running two OLS regressions, according to the method of Stock and Watson (1993). The usual t-statistic is multiplied by the first regression's standard error, and divided by the second regression standard error over 1 minus the autocorrelation coefficients. Table 3 shows that two of the three funds cannot reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating vector is (1, -l) . &mexdev is negative and statistically significant, explaining the unusual premia observed after the devaluation. In other words, the fall in the discount in December 1994 was greater than would be expected from the magnitude of the devaluation and the usual pattern associated with exchange rate changes. We interpret this as a loss in confidence by Mexican investors (relative to U.S. investors). But, perhaps the most convincing piece of evidence supporting this hypothesis was already evident in Figures 1-3 : the change came a few weeks before the devaluation. This supports the hypothesis that the change in discounts was partly due to less optimistic Mexican investors, and not simply to the devaluation itself.
In the second step, we do not constrain the adjustment coefficients to be the equal to each other, in order to check how different they vary. The results displayed in Table 5 show that the short-run elasticities are not very different from the previous one. It takes some time to go back to the long-run relationships. In this case, the coefficients vary from 1370to 22%, implying a half life of around 3 to 5 weeks.
In summary, the results show that it takes a few weeks for the short-run variables to filly adjust to the long-run relationships, assuming that no new discrepancies arise.
Namely, shocks that drive prices and discounts away from their long-run relationships have only a partial effect in the short run. If no new shocks occur, the prices and discounts adjust at rates ranging from 13 to 22 percent of the gap each week. Since the cointegrating coefficients for NAVS are close to one, a change in a NAV means that its price will change by the same amount in the long run. Even after the initial devaluation, on December 20, the discrepancy remained for several months, suggesting that Mexican residents were more aware than foreigners of the negative implications of the crisis for the Mexican economy.
III. WereNAVSand PricesDrivenby DivergentExpectations?
In the previous section we demonstrated mean-reversion in country fund discounts. We also argued that the divergent expectations hypothesis helps explain the prernia observed after the devaluation of December 1994. As the IMF capital markets report argued, Mexican investors reacted first to economic and political local events, i.e., the Mexican investors were the front-runners in the devaluation. In the present section we test that divergent expectations drive country fund NAVS and prices throughout the sample period.
First, the variables are plotted against time to observe the reactions of country funds before the devaluation. Second, two econometric approaches are followed.
Granger-causality tests are computed to search for causality in the variables. Then, a regression is calculated by SUR to obtain point estimates of how different prices and NAVS are statistically related.
The plots of the three stocks contain some information about expectations. showing that discounts started falling sharply before the devaluation.
11Such politicalevents had a statisticallysignificanteffect on Mexicaninterestrates during the year and a half precedingthe crisis, as noted in Frankeland Okongwu (1996) .
As a first econometric approach, Granger-causality tests are estimated to determine whether changes in NAVS preceded changes in prices, not just in December"
1994, but in general. We run the VAR process in first difference form, since the typical Granger-causality test does not have its standard distribution when the variables are 1 (1) .12Four alternative hypotheses may be tested from these tests: prices Granger-cause NAVS, NAVS simultaneously .
Granger-cause prices, neither of them cause the determined. Table 6 shows the results.13 The table other, or they are and corresponding
Ilgure only report the cases where one-direction Granger-causality was found. Figure 4 displays the results in a different way. It indicates the causality relationships with arrows.
All three Mexican NAVS Granger-cause one of both within Mexico and within New York, the other funds.
the three prices in New York. Moreover, biggest Mexican fund, MXF, affects the The arrow sizes of Figure 4 have been chosen in an arbitrary but readily-perceived way. The thick arrow indicates that both of two results hold. First, the probability of accepting the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is less than 5 percent. (More properly, the probability of rejecting the null is higher than 95 percent.) At the same time, the thick arrow means that the difference between the probabilities of accepting the null hypothesis is at least of 50 percentage points. In other words, the difference in probability values (P-values) is at least 0.50, so we are very confident that Granger-causality only 12Schmukler(1996) performsother erogeneity tests, which incorporatecointegratingvectors in the estimation.Thoseresultsare very similarto the ones reportedhere. 13Since the Granger-causalitytest can be very sensitiveto the choice of lag length, different specificationshave been tried, withoutsubstantiallychangingthe results. Only one specification is displayedhere.
goes in one direction, because we accept and reject tie null hypotheses strongly. The thin arrow means that the probability of accepting the null hypothesis is less than 5 percent, and that the difference between probabilities is greater than 10 and less than 50 percentage points.
Having tested that causality goes from Mexico to New York, we estimate, as a second econometric approach, a SUR/VAR. In this case, we are interested in how prices are affected by other variables. We report only one representative SUR estimation in Table 7 . It shows the contemporaneous relationship between NAVS and prices. The variables are in first differences, to avoid the spurious regression problem and to use
Normal limiting distributions. The estimates are calculated by nonlinear least squares, imposing constraints for equal coefficients, but allowing for different constants. The dependent variables are the country fund prices. The independent variables are the fund NAVS, the Mexican exchange rate, the international interest rate, and the dummy for political stability. Under the assumption that the constraints are not too restrictive, the SUR estimation enhances efficiency.
The regression output shows that NAVS are significant in explaining changes in prices, confirming the results obtained with the Granger-causality tests. We also include lagged prices, since we found Granger-causality within prices. In this sense the regression displayed in Table 7 is a VAR, with other exogenous variables. The exchange rate is statistically significant and of the right sign. A drop in the value of the peso is reflected as a fall in the value of the underlying assets in terms of dollars. The dummy variable that reflects political stability is also of the right sign, and significant.
The international interest rate is expected to have a negative effect. since a drop in the international interest rate results in an increase in demands and prices for many assets, including Mexican country funds. The regression yields the right sign. although the variable does not turn out to be significant. A negative coefficient for the interest rate agrees with other studies of foreign investor demand in emerging markets more generally, such as Calve, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) . Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1994) , Dooley et al. (1994 ), Fernandez-Arias (1994 . Okongwu (1996). and Schadler et al. (1993) .
IV. Summaryof Conclusions
In the present paper we use the three Mexican country funds to show evidence that local and foreign investors had divergent expectations during the Mexican crisis of December 1994. The asymmetric information hypothesis was suggested in the aftermath of the crisis, implying that Mexicaninvestors reacted before international investors to newsabout theMexicaneconomy. Thisstatement canbe interpreted intwoways: either domestic and international" investors received two different sets ofinformation, or the local investors weremorealert andsensitive topotential warning signals.
More generally, we incorporate severai elements from the literature on country funds into a new picture of how these funds behave. Even though indirect arbitrage may exist, it faces several obstacles. We suggest that the nature of these barriers may explain mean reversion, or different reactions of country fund discounts in the short run and in the long run. k the short run, discounts may be large due to market iiliquidity or because of increased obstacles to arbitrage. In the long run, they tend to narrow. This hypothesis complements existing models such as the investor-sentiments and the loss-aversion interpretations.
On the empirical side. Section H showed that although a change in a NAV is fully transmitted to the country fund's price in the long run, it is only partially transmitted in the short run. It also showed that the rates of adjustment towards the long-run relationship, estimated by error-correction models, are around 0.15 per week, depending on the case. They imply that 5070of the adjustment takes place in around 3 to 5 weeks. A similar estimate was found for the adjustment of discounts, towards their long-run relationship with the exchange rate. A slow rate of convergence plus the divergent expectations hypothesis suggests a reconciliation between the investor sentiment hypothesis and the loss-aversion one.
simple Section III provided support for the asymmetric expectations hypothesis. The most and immediate proof of heterogeneous expectations is in Figures 1-3 , which show that NAVS fell first or faster relative to prices right before the devaluation. Grangercausality tests, a SUWAR confirm that observation more generally.
Several extensions of this work are desirable. First, the results could be enriched by a larger data set covering more countries, as well as by higher frequency data, if the data can be obtained. Second, there is a need for valid instrumental variables to cope with potential endogeneity. Third, a theoretical model needs to be constructed to explore further some of the ideas expressed in this paper. 
Appendix1: Closed-endCountryFunds
The three closed-end funds used are: Prices are recorded on the day the NAVS were calculated, usually Fridays.
Appendix2: Descriptionof VariablesandData~4
Country-Funds data have been provided kindly by R. -mefnavl, mefpricel, mefdisc, mxenavl, mxepricel, mxedisc, @avl, m~pricel, wfdisc; Correspond to the Mexican country funds described in Appendix 1. For each country fund, its NAV, price and discount are available. NAVS and prices are all expressed in logarithms, while discounts are differences of logarithms.
Variables:
-dpolstab: Qualitative variable that reflects political stability in Mexico. Contains 1s
when President Zedillo was elected and when the NAFTA agreement was approved.
Contains -1s when disturbing political events arose in Mexico, i.e. in Colosio and RuizMassieu assassinations, under the Chiapas uprising and when the peso devalued. Contains 0s otherwise.
-dumexdev: Is a dummy variable, with 1 for the six months after the Mexican devaluation and Ootherwise.
-mexerl: Mexican exchange rate in logarithms. Equals the log of the amount of dollars per peso.
-tbilllml: One-month Treasury bill rate in logarithms.
14All the model have been estimated using the statistical packages Econometric Views and TSP. dmef~ric-~R ob. ofac.eptin~<5%, diffe~e~~elnP~~bablli~l~~~fa~l~a~~5OP~rCenta~e~0intS.~~b . ofaccepting c 5%,difference in probabilities between 10 and 50 percentage points. 
